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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DAVID SHANE McBRIDE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 960324-CA 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment and order of restitution ancillary 
to a conviction for joyriding, a class A misdemeanor, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1311 (1993), in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Anne M. Stirba, Judge, presiding over the restitution 
proceedings. 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
DAVID SHANE McBRIDE, : Case No. 960324-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or other infamous crime, unless on a presentment 
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in 
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall 
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice 
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
The fourteenth amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides: 
Section 1. [Citizenship -- Due process of law -- Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of las; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of laws. 
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law,] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-707 (1993) (repealed effective May 
1, 1995) provided: 
41-la-707. Transfer complete upon division's issuing 
new certificate of registration and title• 
Until the division has issued a new certificate 
of registration and certificate of title, delivery of any 
vehicle required to be registered is not made and title 
has not passed, and the intended transfer is incomplete 
and not valid or effective for any purpose except as 
provided in Section 41-la-708 [limiting liability of 
former owner for damages caused by negligent operation of 
the vehicle after transfer]. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (Supp. 1996) provides: 
63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by 
negligent act or omission of employee--Exceptions 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities 
is waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent 
act or omission of an employee committed within the scope 
of employment except if the injury arises out of, in 
connection with, or results from: 
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure 
to exercise or perform a discretionary function, 
whether or not the discretion is abused; 
(2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, 
false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional 
trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, 
interference with contract rights, infliction of 
mental anguish, or violation of civil rights; 
(3) the issuance, denial, suspension, or 
revocation of or by the failure or refusal to 
issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, 
license, certificate, approval, order, or similar 
authorization; 
(4) a failure to make an inspection or by 
making an inadequate or negligent inspection; 
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(5) the institution oi prosecution of any 
j udicial or admini strative proceeding, even if 
malicious or without probable cause; 
(6) a. misrepresentation by an employee whet he -
or not it is negligent or intentional; 
(7) riots, i ml awfu.l assembi : pub^ivj 
demonstrations, n 10b ^ r "'.•-• i.-<= c i *: "• 
disturbances; 
(8) the collection of and assessment ot :axes; 
(9) the activities of the Utah National Guard; 
(10) the incarceration of any person in. any 
state prison, county or cir.v - i ; -•r ^tber place 
^^ leaal ^f -nf inement ; 
.:,••;' natural condition - publicly owned 
or controlled Ian J ••• condition existing in 
•'•'onection with cm ^^andoned mine or mining 
..ration, oi. any activity authorized by the School 
and Institutional Trust Lands Administration or the 
rivi^o-'o rA- Forestry, Fire and State Lands; 
research or implementation of cloud 
:,
-.H!iac!'-*.r":.* c) seeding for the clearing of fog; 
i'.i -• he management of fl ood water s, 
earthquake , or natural disasters; 
. • ' he construction, repair, or operation of 
; t ~ o-rm systems ; 
i _• .he operation t. .;. an emergency vehicle, 
while being driven in accordance with the 
requirements of Section 41-6-14; 
(16) n latent dangerous or 1 atent defective 
condition of any highway, road, street, alley, 
crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bri dge, 
viaduct.. ~r other structure located on them; 
. latent dangerous or latent defective 
.;, of any public building, structure, dam,,, 
or other public improvement; 
.activities of: 
p rov iding emergency med i c a 1 
- • . . , L >- - , 
fighting fire; 
regulating, mitigating, or Handling 
h'f 7^ , is materials or hazardous wastes; 
»i' emergency evacuations; or 
intervening during dam emergencies; 
(19i the exercise or performance or the 
failure t J exercise or perform any function 
pursuant 'o Title 73, Chapter 5a or Title 73, 
Chapter .: which immunity is in addition to all 
other immunities granted by law, 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1996) provides: 
-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed 
-- Civil penalties -- Restitution -- Hearing --
Definitions -- Resentencing -- Aggravation or 
mitigation of crimes with mandatory sentences. 
) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of 
which the defendant is convicted or any other criminal 
conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility 
to the sentencing court with or without an admission 
of committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special 
damages, but not general damages, which a person could 
recover against the defendant in a civil action 
arising out of the facts or events constituting the 
defendant's criminal activities and includes the money 
equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken, or 
otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings and 
medical expenses. 
(d) "-Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal 
payment for pecuniary damages to a victim, including 
the accrual of interest from the time of sentencing, 
insured damages, and payment for expenses to a 
governmental entity for extradition or transportation 
and as further defined in Subsection (4)(c). 
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court 
determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a 
result of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any 
coparticipant in the defendant's criminal 
activities. 
) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal 
activity that has resulted in pecuniary 
damages, in addition to any other sentence it 
may impose, the court shall order that the 
defendant make restitution to victims of crime 
as provided in this subsection, or for conduct 
for which the defendant has agreed to make 
restitution as part of a plea agreement. 
s added. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78 2 7 3 8 (Si IJ »j: > 1 9,96) pi )v:i des : 
78-27-38, Comparative negligence 
(1) The fault of a person seek . . ; . • . . : 
alone bar recovery by that person. 
(2) A person seeking recovery may recover from any 
defendant or group of defendants whose fault, combined 
with the fault of persons immune from suit, exceeds the 
fault, of the person seeking recovery prior to any 
real] ocation of fault made under Subsection 78-27-39(2) . 
(3) No defendant is liable to any person seeking 
recovery for any amount ir; excess of the proportion of 
fault attribul ^ + s ' ^efendan*" -ri~r faction 
78-27-39, 
(4) (a) ri determining the proportionate fault 
attributable to each defendant, the fact finder 
.may, and when requested by a party shall, consider 
the conduct of any person who contributed to the 
alleged injury regardless of whether the person is 
a person immune from suit or a defendant in the 
action and may allocate fault ' > each person 
seeking recovery, to each defendant, and to any 
person immune from, si lit who contributed to the 
alleged injury. 
(b) Any fault allocated to a person immune 
from, suit is considered only to accurately 
determine the fault of the person seeking recovery 
and a defendant and may not subject the person 
immune from suit to any liability, 'based on the 
allocation of fault, in this or any other action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-40 /cnpr 1 Q96) provides: 
78-27 • 40, Amount ;: iiai;ij.t} ii.fi,; -ed •.- proportion, of 
fault--No contribution 
(1) Subject, to Section 16 2/--3b, i ^ muAxmum aruCunL 
for which a defendant may be liable to any person seeking 
recovery is that percentage or proportion of the damages 
equivalent to the percentage -^r nrnr-.-irr •; .^.r -*f fanif 
attributed to that defendant. 
(2) A defendant is not eni"il±^a re v-nxi .mu. ion from 
any other person. 
(3) A defendant oi
 LC,^.JI. seeking recovery may net 
bring a civil, action, against any person immune from suit 
to recover damages result--ing fr™" t ^ ^~ "ocatior ^ ^?"V" 
under Section 78-27-38. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE STATE'S CONVERSION THEORY DOES NOT 
SUPPORT IMPOSITION OF RESTITUTION UNDER THE 
FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
(responding to State's brief at Point I, pp. 7-12) 
The State misapprehends the thrust of Mr. McBride's 
argument. He does not assert that third party negligence is a 
defense to conversion. Rather, he asserts that the State has 
failed to prove that the temporary conversion resulting from his 
crime caused any pecuniary damages. Instead, all damages caused by 
loss of the vehicle were proximately caused by police negligence in 
incorrectly copying the VIN and failing to notify the owners of the 
impounded vehicle. 
A. THE STATE'S SALE THEORY IS INAPPLICABLE, 
BECAUSE THE ALLEGED VICTIM HAS NO 
AUTOMOBILE TO FORCE MR. McBRIDE TO BUY. 
Quoting Dean Prosser, Law of Torts, § 15 at 83 (4th ed. 
1971), the State asserts that "the plaintiff acquires the right to 
enforce a sale, and recover the full value of the property." 
State's brief at 9, see also State's brief at 19-20. This type of 
civil claim seems to be of the type best left to civil litigation. 
State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979, 983 (Utah App. 1993). 
Notwithstanding, this theory is unavailing, because the 
car has been sold at impound sale. The alleged victim has no car 
to force Mr. McBride to buy. 
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B. I IE McBRlDE IS ENTITLED TO P. N OFFSET 
TI IE CAR HE RETURNED. 
The State si lpp] :i es a ] ai 11 id] : y ] :i st : f p^  : 'tei itial defenses 
to a conversion action, citing 18 Am J ur.2d Conversion §§ 93-104. 
These are red h^rr:n;^f as •- Mr-Bride claims no defense. Rather, 
In an action fc: conversion, although the plaintiff is 
generally entitled to recover the value of the property 
converted, the defendant is permitted to show the 
existence of facts which would make it i 222just to a 2 low 
tlie plaintiff to recover such amount 
* : :: _ : Conversion § 124 ^yv-r lempnasis added; Mr. McBride 
has irade precisely '*W 1 assess: 
he 
property is general Jy regarded as properly considered in mitigation 
r
 ' d a m a ere s r ° ^' " *7 ^ _y~ a b ° i c 
b e n e f i t of t h e i*a^  '; . iwt 
offset for * -r r^UA ~ - " 
w,vf rsion. JUI.zd ,.onver 
- , • repossessed <
 : the police for the 
^wner Mr. McBride i s entitled to an 
-"-turned. 
n accord: 
Now ordina: \ 1\ 
returned; \.rr 
%
 ^(Tiversion, when, the property is not 
-ijure of damages is the value of the 
property at the - ime of the conversion. But that is not 
so when the property has been returned and received by 
the plaintiff, In such case, the return to, and 
acceptance of LL<> property by, the plaintiff, though not 
a bar t<^  trie action, nevertheless goes in mitigation of 
damages, for the plaintiff cannot have the full value of 
the property co* verted and r>t * he MT T . j i me have the 
property it self 
W!.i.ittier v -_~_-i. 
T h e f- . - „oexi recogiiizts i. jidt "['] r e t u r n of [the] 
converted property a.et :_<_*_ jar a suit for conversion, but goes 
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merely to reducing the damages. ['] Campbell v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 840 P.2d 130 [, 140] (Utah App. 1992)." State's 
brief at 19. Mr. McBride is entitled to an offset for the vehicle 
seized by the police for the benefit of the vehicle owner. 
There being no loss here attributable to Mr. McBride, and 
the car having been returned in satisfactory condition to the 
police for the benefit of any persons entitled to it, the State has 
failed to prove pecuniary damages. No restitution should have been 
ordered. 
C. ANY LOSS OCCASIONED HERE IS STRICTLY THE 
RESULT OF THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE POLICE IN 
FAILING TO PROPERLY COPY THE VIN NUMBER, 
AND NOTIFY THE OWNER PRIOR TO SALE. 
The State asserts that negligence may not be interposed 
as a defense to an intentional tort. However, Mr. McBride's 
joyride resulted in no loss. No pecuniary damages arise as a 
result of Mr. McBride's criminal conduct, and his temporary 
exercise of dominion over the vehicle. Instead, the loss of the 
vehicle is solely attributable to the police, and the impound sale 
that occurred without notification of the vehicle owner. In this 
context, the comparative fault principles enunciated in Mr. 
McBride's opening brief at pp. 19-20 are fully applicable. 
A court or jury assessing such responsibility could 
reasonably find the police 100% responsible as a result of their 
negligence in miscopying the VIN and failing to notify the owners. 
A court or jury could also find that, due to Mr. Martinez's failure 
to obtain a properly notarized title with completed mileage 
8 
disclosure, and his failure to register the car or obtain a title 
in his name, that notice would have gone to Craig Allen and the 
loss of the car would thus be attributable to Mr. Martinez, who 
could not be notified. Regardless of how fault is proportioned 
between the police and Mr. Martinez, it is clear that Mr. McBride 
is not responsible for the ultimate loss of the car, which occurred 
as the result of unforeseeable negligence on the part of others. 
Under § 78-27-40, his liability is limited to his proportion of 
fault, which is zero. The restitution order should not have been 
entered. 
POINT II. THE STATE'S SIMPLISTIC VIEW OF THE 
RELEVANT ISSUES INVOLVED IN DETERMINING THE 
APPROPRIATENESS OF RESTITUTION IS NOT 
SUPPORTED OR WARRANTED. 
The State asserts that the only two factual issues to be 
decided at the restitution hearing were the owner of the car, and 
the value of the owner's interest. State's brief at 13. Even if 
these were the only issues, the State failed to adduce sufficiently 
reliable evidence to establish that Mr. Martinez was the owner of 
the car. The vehicle title he produced, see opening brief at 
addendum C, was facially invalid. The state and federally required 
milage disclosure statement was left blank, and the purported 
signature of Craig L. Allen is unnotarized. The title is legally 
insufficient to establish ownership in Mr. Martinez. 
Other issues are necessarily involved in a determination 
of whether restitution is appropriate on the facts here. Rule 12 
of the Rules of Civil Procedure allows and requires a civil 
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defendant to assert defenses and third party claims. See also Rule 
14, governing third party practice. In a civil suit, Mr. McBride 
would be entitled to implead the police as a third party defendant 
and assert that their negligence is solely or partially responsible 
for Mr. Martinez's purported loss. Issues of causation and 
proportional fault must necessarily be determined. 
These issues are all best left to civil litigation. 
Robinson, 860 P.2d at 983. No restitution order should have been 
entered. 
CONCLUSION 
For the forgoing reasons, and as set forth in his opening 
brief, Mr. McBride respectfully requests that the restitution order 
be vacated. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this IHL day of March, 1997. 
<M—-
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
LISA J. REMAL 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, Robert K. Heineman, hereby certify that I have caused 
eight copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84102, and four copies to BARNARD N. MADSEN, the Attorney 
General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South 6th 
Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this 
ll±L day of March, 1997. 
X W . 
Robert K. Heineman 
DELIVERED/MAILED this day of March, 1997. 
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